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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e⁄ects of the formation of a regional trade agreement on
the level and nature of multinational ￿rm activity. We examine aggregate data that
captures the response of U.S. multinational ￿rms to the formation of the ASEAN
free trade agreement. Observed patterns guide the development of a model in which
heterogeneous ￿rms from a source country decide how to serve two foreign markets.
Following a reduction in tari⁄s on trade between the two foreign countries, the model
predicts growth in the number of source-country ￿rms engaging in foreign direct
investment, growth in the size of a¢ liates that are active in reforming countries
both before and after the tari⁄ reduction, and an increase in the extent to which
the sales of a¢ liates in reforming countries are directed towards other reforming
countries. Analysis of ￿rm-level responses to the creation of the ASEAN free trade
agreement yields results that are consistent with these predictions.
￿Harvard University and NBER; Harvard Business School and NBER. This paper was prepared for the
Workshop on ￿Quantifying the Costs and Bene￿ts of Regional Economic Integration,￿held on January
19-20, 2009 in Hong Kong. The statistical analysis of ￿rm-level data on U.S. multinational companies
was conducted at the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce under arrangements
that maintain legal con￿dentiality requirements. The views expressed are those of the authors and do
not re￿ ect o¢ cial positions of the U.S. Department of Commerce. We are grateful to Eduardo Morales
for superb research assistance and to Robert Barro, Elhanan Helpman, Jong-Wha Lee, Emanuel Ornelas,
Bill Zeile, and seminar participants at Harvard and the Asian Development Bank for helpful suggestions.1 Introduction
Regional trade agreements signi￿cantly impact the structure of international trade ￿ ows.
Existing research emphasizes the costs and bene￿ts inherent in the trade creation and
trade diversion e⁄ects of these agreements and considers if they generate incentives for
trading partners to promote or thwart the development of an open multilateral trading
system. Most of the existing analyses fail to consider the e⁄ect of regional trade agree-
ments on patterns of foreign direct investment. In this paper, we study these e⁄ects.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the behavior of multinational ￿rms based in the U.S.
around the time of a single event, the signing of the ASEAN FTA (AFTA) in January of
1992. We begin by reviewing aggregate data on U.S. multinationals and then use some
broad trends in those data to guide the development of a model of how multinationals
based outside of a region respond to the formation of a free trade agreement in the region.
This model builds on the work of Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), and incorporates
￿rm-level heterogeneity to generate predictions of how lower regional trade costs a⁄ect
the intensive and extensive margins of foreign direct investor activity. In addition to high-
lighting e⁄ects on levels of activity, the theory also delivers implications for the share of
multinational a¢ liate activity directed towards serving di⁄erent markets. Departing from
previous approaches that only used aggregate data, we test these predictions using the
￿rm-level results of the benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad conducted
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The ASEAN agreement of 1992 was signed by six countries: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. In subsequent years, four additional countries joined
AFTA; Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. The original
agreement outlined a program of progressive tari⁄ reductions to be carried out through
2008, but the member countries subsequently decided to accelerate reforms and make
AFTA fully operational on January 1, 2003. We analyze data on U.S. multinational op-
erations in ASEAN and other Asian countries in the 1989 and 1994 benchmark survey
years. Doing so allows for a comparison of the changing structure of multinational ac-
tivity in countries that signed AFTA in 1992 and in other similar countries. Our tests
therefore attempt to rule out the possibility that changes in activity in ASEAN countries
are driven by factors unrelated to AFTA like technological shocks or other general drivers
of U.S. multinational expansion. While ASEAN tari⁄ reductions continued after 1994,
substantial progress had been made by that time, and it is plausible that U.S. multina-
tionals would have started responding to the process of regional trade integration shortly
after the signing of the agreement in 1992. Although the results are robust to analyzing
1longer time frames, our main analysis does not use data from the 1999 benchmark survey
because a subset of AFTA￿ s signing countries experienced a severe ￿nancial crisis in 1997,
which a⁄ected FDI into the region for reasons quite distinct from those analyzed here.
Section 2 of the paper describes broad patterns regarding the operations of U.S. multi-
national ￿rms in Asia in 1989 and 1994. The data indicate a surge in the level of activity
in ASEAN countries around the time of the formation of AFTA that exceeds levels of
growth in other Asian countries. Analysis of growth among a¢ liates that were active
both before and after the creation of AFTA and net entry of a¢ liates reveals that both
types of growth contributed to the higher levels of relative expansion in ASEAN countries.
More speci￿cally, about one-third of the growth in U.S. multinational activity is due to
growth in the number of a¢ liates, while the remaining two-thirds is due to growth in
the levels of activity at the a¢ liate level. Some interesting changes in the direction of
U.S. multinational a¢ liate sales also emerge around the time of the creation of AFTA.
In particular, it is possible to distinguish between a¢ liate sales to their host markets,
sales to the U.S., and sales to third countries. In ASEAN countries, sales to third coun-
tries increased substantially between 1989 and 1994, while this share remained virtually
unchanged in other Asian countries. The growth in the third-country sales share among
ASEAN a¢ liates is driven by both an increase in the share of third-country sales of af-
￿liates that were active before AFTA, as well as the fact that new a¢ liates in the area
direct more of their sales to third countries than other a¢ liates.
These broad patterns guide the formulation of some theory, which is presented in
Section 3. We develop a simple three-country extension of the model of FDI with het-
erogeneous ￿rms developed in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). The main innovation
of our model is the introduction of third-market sales, and our main theoretical results
concern the responses of multinational ￿rms based in one country (the West) to a re-
duction of trade barriers between the other two countries in the model (the South and
the East). We interpret this change as regional trade integration between these other
two countries. The model predicts an increase in the number of Western ￿rms engaging
in FDI in the South-East area. Furthermore, the model indicates the there should be
growth on the intensive margin in that a¢ liates that operate before and after the regional
trade agreement should expand. The theory also predicts that regional trade agreements
lead to gross entry and exit of Western a¢ liates operating in the South-East area, with
the net e⁄ect depending on the distribution of productivity across ￿rms. With a Pareto
distribution of productivity, gross entry exceeds gross exit and the extensive margin re-
sponds positively to the agreement. The model also has clear implications for the e⁄ects
2of the regional trade agreements on the sales of Western a¢ liates to countries other than
their host country. In particular, lowering trade barriers between the East and the South
increases the share of a¢ liate sales going to third countries for three reasons. First, new
Western a¢ liates in the South-East area sell more to third markets than the average
Western-owned a¢ liate does. Second, some Western ￿rms that were active in both South
and East before the agreement consolidate activity in one of these countries after the
formation of the free trade area and serve the country they leave through regional trade.
Finally, a¢ liates of U.S. parents that are active in only one market (South or East) before
and after the regional trade agreement also increase the share of a¢ liate sales going to
third markets.
These predictions are consistent with the broad patterns described in Section 2 of the
paper, and Section 4 presents a more rigorous analysis of them. Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
estimates illustrate statistically distinctive behavior of U.S. multinational a¢ liates in
ASEAN and other Asian countries. A¢ liates that existed in 1989 and 1994 grew faster in
ASEAN countries than other countries. Consistent with the theoretical results obtained
under a Pareto distribution of productivity, levels of U.S. multinational activity measured
at the country/industry level also increase as a result of AFTA. Predictions concerning the
direction of a¢ liate sales also receive support in the data, and there is evidence that the
channels by which free trade agreements a⁄ect the direction of sales described above are
operative. These results hold controlling for other time-varying country speci￿c factors
that might confound the results, like di⁄erences in GDP per capita growth and changes
in tax rates.
These ￿ndings contribute to two main literatures. First, they point out a neglected
consequence of regional trade agreements: these agreements a⁄ect foreign direct invest-
ment from countries outside the region. Traditional theoretical analyses of regional trade
agreements build on the work of Viner (1950) and focus on the welfare consequences of
trade creation and trade diversion e⁄ects. Krueger (1999) reviews the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on preferential trade agreements, but this review does not consider e⁄ects
related to foreign direct investment. Some theoretical work does point out implications
for foreign direct investment responses. Motta and Norman (1996), Krugman and Ven-
ables (1996), Puga and Venables (1997), and Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007) each
provide a basis by which a reduction in tari⁄s between two countries would increase for-
eign investment from third countries. Although relatively few papers empirically test for
e⁄ects of regional trade agreements on foreign direct investment from outside the region,
Chen (2008) is an exception. The results in Chen (2008) indicate marginally signi￿cant
3e⁄ects of free trade agreements that do not cover the U.S. on aggregate levels of U.S.
multinational a¢ liate sales. Although our theory generates subtle predictions regarding
aggregate levels of a¢ liate sales, our results con￿rm and expand on those in Chen (2008).
The e⁄ects of regional trade agreements on foreign direct investment are likely to have
signi￿cant welfare consequences given the unique nature of multinational ￿rms. Several
strands of the literature indicate bene￿ts for host countries. Aitken, Hanson, and Harri-
son (1996) and Heyman, Sj￿holm, and Tingvall (2007) ￿nd that multinational ￿rms pay
their workers a premium relative to comparable domestic ￿rms, and Aitken and Harrison
(1999) and Smarzynska (2004) show these ￿rms are also more productive than comparable
domestic ￿rms. A large body of work, including recent papers by Smarzynska (2004) and
Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007), also points out that multinationals can generate
spillovers for other ￿rms through a variety of channels. Depending on the nature of the
relation between the foreign and domestic activity of multinationals, the formation of
regional trade agreements could also have consequences for the home countries of multi-
nationals that increase their regional investment. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2008) ￿nd
that domestic and foreign activities are complements, suggesting that increased foreign
activity in response to a regional trade agreement could yield some bene￿ts to countries
that are the source of foreign direct investment.
Our paper also informs the literature that introduces ￿rm heterogeneity to models of
trade and multinational activity. Theoretical attempts at understanding the existence
and behavior of multinationals have emphasized horizontal, vertical, and export-platform
motivations.1 Only recently have researchers attempted to incorporate ￿rm level hetero-
geneity in these type of models. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Antr￿s and Helpman
(2004), Nocke and Yeaple (2008), and Yeaple (2008a and 2008b) are notable examples of
work in this vain. Our model introduces the possibility of export-platform behavior into a
model that is similar to the one in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). It then confronts
this theory with detailed ￿rm-level data by analyzing how multinationals respond to a
speci￿c change in trade costs. By using a detailed panel data set, we are able to explore
￿rm-level responses at both the intensive and extensive margins.
A couple of limitations of our study are worth pointing out. Our empirical tests focus
on the formation of a single free trade agreement, and the response to this reform may not
1The horizontal FDI view represents FDI as the replication of capacity in multiple locations in response
to factors such as trade costs, as in Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), and Markusen and Venables (2000).
The vertical FDI view represents FDI as the geographic distribution of production globally in response to
the opportunities a⁄orded by di⁄erent markets, as in Helpman (1984) and Yeaple (2003). Caves (1996)
and Markusen (2002) provide particularly useful overviews of this literature.
4be representative. Furthermore, given the limited number of countries that signed this
agreement and the limited variation in characteristics across them, we have not explored
empirically any asymmetries in the e⁄ects on foreign direct investment across countries.
Our theory could be used to generate further predictions related to country characteristics,
however. We also only examine the response of foreign direct investors based in the U.S.
While this is largely a consequence of data limitations, it is worth pointing out that the
U.S. was by no means a small investor in the area during the period under study. Although
it is di¢ cult to ￿nd comparable data on measures of foreign investment across host and
source countries, the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database provides
information on the outward FDI position of many OECD countries in ASEAN countries.
The coverage in this database is reasonably complete, but data are missing for a number
of countries that were OECD members during the 1989-1994 period including Belgium,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. Among those
countries reporting investment in the ASEAN region, the U.S. held a 22-27% share of
aggregated investment position over the 1989-1994 period. Only Japan (with a share of
roughly 50%) featured higher levels of FDI in the ASEAN area during that time period.
2 A First Look at the Data
In this section, we provide a broad description of U.S. multinational activity in ASEAN
countries around the time that AFTA was formed. Aggregate data reveal if levels of U.S.
multinational activity increased in ASEAN countries relative to other Asian countries
when AFTA was created and if the nature of multinational activity appears to have
changed as the costs of serving regional customers fell. In this section, we document some
broad empirical trends that help guide the development of the theory and that we later
test in a more rigorous manner.
Data on multinationals are drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) bench-
mark surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. In our main analyses, we use data on
nonbank a¢ liates and their parents from the 1989 and 1994 surveys as these years span
the formation of AFTA and avoid the 1997 Asian ￿nancial crisis.2 These data provide
a panel of data on the ￿nancial and operating characteristics of U.S. multinational ￿rms
operating abroad. U.S. direct investment abroad is de￿ned as the direct or indirect owner-
2Our sample includes nonbank a¢ liates that ￿led long or short survey forms; it excludes estimates for
a¢ liates that did not ￿le a survey report. Our sample therefore di⁄ers from the data used to produce
aggregates published by BEA. Only majoity-owned nonbank a¢ liates report data used in the analysis
presented in Tables 4, 8 and 9 so smaller samples are used in creating these.
5ship or control by a single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting securities
of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincor-
porated foreign business enterprise. A U.S. multinational entity is the combination of
a single U.S. legal entity that has made the direct investment, called the U.S. parent,
and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign a¢ liate. As a result of
con￿dentiality assurances and penalties for noncompliance, BEA believes that coverage
is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high.
The survey forms that U.S. multinational enterprises are required to complete track
basic information on a¢ liate sales, assets, employment compensation, and net property
plant and equipment. In addition, for majority-owned a¢ liates, the survey forms also
capture the direction of sales. More speci￿cally, the survey results provide information on
the level of a¢ liate sales to persons in the a¢ liate￿ s host country, to persons in the U.S.,
and to persons in third countries.
Table 1 presents measures of aggregate activity in ASEAN countries and in other
Asian countries for the years 1989 and 1994.3 The formation of AFTA in 1992 appears to
have induced a surge in U.S. MNE activity in the ASEAN countries relative to the rest of
Asia, and this surge appears to be a consequence of growth on the intensive and extensive
margins. In between 1989 and 1994, the number of a¢ liates in ASEAN countries increased
from 740 to 1,065 or by a margin of 44%. This is larger than the 26% increase in the
number of a¢ liates in other Asian countries. In addition to high growth in the number of
a¢ liates in the ASEAN region, there is also a sizeable increase in the number of parent
￿rms. In 1989, there were 309 parent ￿rms with operations in ASEAN countries, and
by 1994 this number had grown to 403. This rate of growth exceeded the growth in the
number of parent ￿rms that were active in other Asian countries. Therefore, a part of the
large relative U.S. MNE activity growth in ASEAN countries comes from growth on the
extensive margin.
Measures of ￿rm size and factor use increase by larger amounts than a¢ liate counts. In
the ASEAN region, levels of a¢ liate sales, assets, employment compensation, and net PPE
all increase by 125% or more in between 1989 and 1994, but they increase by only 32-54%
in other Asian countries. These patterns illustrate that growth on the intensive margin is
also important in explaining the increase in U.S. MNE activity. In particular, the ￿gures
in Table 1 indicate that about two-thirds of the growth in a¢ liate sales is accounted for
by increases in average sales per a¢ liate (intensive margin) while the remaining one-third
3The other Asian countries include all non-ASEAN countries in the Asia and Paci￿c grouping used
by BEA.
6is explained by growth in the number of a¢ liates (extensive margin).
Tables 2 and 3 respectively present additional analysis of the intensive and extensive
margins of growth. Table 2 presents similar information to that in Table 1, but it only
aggregates measures of activity for a¢ liates that exist in 1989 and survive until 1994. For
this group of a¢ liates, aggregate levels of sales, assets, employment compensation, and
net PPE more than double in ASEAN countries, but increase by much lower amounts in
other Asian countries.
Table 3 displays aggregate measures of activity for a¢ liates that exit and enter the
data. The ￿rst column shows 1989 measures for a¢ liates that exist in the 1989 data but
that leave the sample before 1994. The second column shows 1994 measures for a¢ liates
that report in 1994 but that did not exist in the data in 1989. Comparing the ￿rst and
second columns therefore provides insights about the e⁄ects of net entry on the extent
of U.S. MNE activity. As suggested by the aggregate data, net entry is much larger in
ASEAN as opposed to other Asian countries. In ASEAN countries, the count of 558 new
a¢ liates in 1994 is about 2.4 times the count of 233 a¢ liates which exit the data. In
other Asian countries, however, the ratio of entering a¢ liates to exiting a¢ liates is only
about 1.8. Aggregate measures of sales, assets, employment compensation, and net PPE
are approximately 3 times larger for entering than exiting a¢ liates in ASEAN countries.
In other Asian countries, these measures are similar for entering and exiting a¢ liates.
Thus, the large increase in U.S. MNE activity in ASEAN countries around the time of
the signing of AFTA, re￿ ects an increase in the size of a¢ liates that existed in 1989 and
survive until 1994 as well as higher levels of entry relative to exit in ASEAN countries.
For majority-owned a¢ liates, the BEA data also include information on sales by des-
tination, including sales to persons in the a¢ liate￿ s host country, sales to persons in the
U.S., and sales to persons in third countries. Sales to third countries would include sales
by a¢ liates to persons in ASEAN countries other than the a¢ liate￿ s host country, and
the theory developed in the next section indicates that these kinds of sales should increase
around the formation of AFTA. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on sales shares that
are computed using aggregate data. For the top panel, data on all a¢ liates are used
to compute sales shares for di⁄erent types of sales for ￿rms in ASEAN and other Asian
countries.4 Compared to a¢ liates in other Asian countries, a¢ liates in ASEAN countries
direct a smaller fraction of their sales to their host market and larger fractions to the U.S.
and to third countries.
4In order to avoid the possible disclosure of con￿dential information, published aggregate data that
exclude Brunei are used to compute the ￿gures in the top panel.
7Examining changes in sales patterns suggests that AFTA did indeed increase the share
of sales to third countries for a¢ liates in the ASEAN region relative to a¢ liates in the
rest of Asia. The share of sales to third countries for a¢ liates in ASEAN countries
increased from 28.3% to 32.5% between 1989 and 1994 while this share decreased slightly
in other Asian countries, equaling 12.8% in 1989 and 11.2% in 1994. Accompanying these
changes, the share of sales to persons in the a¢ liate￿ s host country increased by slightly
higher amounts in other Asian countries. The share of sales to the U.S. fell for a¢ liates
in both sets of countries and by larger amounts in ASEAN as opposed to other Asian
countries.
Panels B and C of Table 4 provide information on the direction of sales for a¢ liates
that exist in 1989 and 1994 as well as for a¢ liates that enter and exit. Panel B displays
data for the survivors, and it reveals patterns that are very similar to those observed for
the whole sample. The share of sales to third countries disproportionately increases for
a¢ liates in ASEAN countries. In Panel C, the ￿rst column displays 1989 sales shares
for a¢ liates that appear in 1989 but exit before 1994, and the second column displays
1994 sales shares for a¢ liates that do not appear in 1989 but enter in 1994. In ASEAN
countries, new entrants are more focused on selling to third countries and less focused on
selling to the host market and the U.S. than exiting a¢ liates. 41.2% of the 1994 sales of
new entrants is directed to third countries, but only 33.3% of exiting a¢ liate 1989 sales
is directed to these markets. However, an opposite pattern appears for entrants and exits
in other Asian countries. In these countries, 10.1% of the 1994 sales of new entrants is
directed to third markets, and this share is 16.0% for the a¢ liates that exited. Therefore,
growth in the share of sales to third countries among a¢ liates in the ASEAN region in
part re￿ ects growth in this share for surviving a¢ liates and in part re￿ ects growth that
is a consequence of new a¢ liates having relatively high shares of third-country sales.
Further unreported analysis suggests that models of horizontal foreign direct invest-
ment are more salient in explaining the response of U.S. multinationals than models of
vertical foreign direct investment. If multinationals increased their vertical specialization
within regions that entered into a trade agreement, one should observe ￿rms expand into
several regional countries and increase their level of sales by a¢ liates in one part of the
region to a¢ liates in other parts of the region. While U.S. multinational ￿rms do appear
to expand within the ASEAN region, those ￿rms that increase the number of countries in
which they operate do not appear to have high or increasing levels of intra￿rm regional
transactions.
In summary, aggregated descriptive statistics indicate that U.S. multinational activity
8in the ASEAN region disproportionately increased at the time of the formation of AFTA.
This increase re￿ ects growth on the intensive and extensive margins. Within the ASEAN
region, the share of a¢ liate sales to countries other than host countries also increases,
and it appears that the increase is a consequence of changes among a¢ liates that operate
before AFTA as well as changes in the composition of activity because of net entry. These
aggregate patterns do not, however, indicate the statistical signi￿cance of di⁄erences in
￿rm behavior. Furthermore, because aggregate measures are particularly sensitive to the
activities of large ￿rms, the patterns in the aggregates might not indicate the experiences
of the typical ￿rm. Aggregate patterns could also re￿ ect other trends in ASEAN and
other Asian countries, like di⁄erence in per capita growth rates or changes in tax policy.
In order to address these considerations, it is helpful to employ the ￿rm-level data in more
rigorous regression analysis. However, before doing so we develop some theory that serves
as a guide to the analysis.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we develop a simple model to illustrate the e⁄ects of a regional trade
agreement on the patterns of FDI in the set of countries signing the agreement. Our goal
in developing the model is to provide a simple rationale for the broad empirical patterns
described in the previous section and to formally develop a set of hypotheses that are
explored econometrically in the next section.
3.1 A Simple Model of FDI
Our model is a simple variant of the framework in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004).5
We consider a world of three countries: the West, the East and the South. The model
studies the optimal international organization of production from the point of view of
￿rms based in the West, which in the empirical analysis we associate with the United
States. These ￿rms own the technology to produce a di⁄erentiated good with demand
y = A
jp
￿￿
in country j = W;E;S. There is a continuum of ￿rms based in the West, which we
index by their heterogeneous productivity level ’, and we let the cumulative distribution
5Similar extensions are developed by Yeaple (2003, 2008a and 2008b) and Grossman, Helpman and
Szeidl (2006), but the focus of those papers is very di⁄erent.
9function of productivity be G(’).
Final goods are produced combining skilled and unskilled labor. We allow ￿rms to
produce their ￿nal good in each of the three countries, which we index by % = W;E;S.
The unit variable cost of production for a ￿rm with productivity ’ producing in country
% is given by
c
% (’) =
1
’
(w
%
S)
￿ (w
%
U)
1￿￿ ,
where w
%
S denotes the wage rate of skilled workers in the country where the good is
produced, and w
%
U denotes the analogous wage rate for unskilled workers.
Although our main results go through when all countries have the same factor prices,
we shall assume that the unskilled-labor wage is lower in the South than in the East or
West, i.e.,
w
W
U = w
E
U > w
S
U.
For simplicity, we assume that the wage of skilled workers is identical in all three countries
and we set it equal to one (so skilled labor is the numeraire in the model), i.e.,
w
W
S = w
E
S = w
S
S = 1.
It is straightforward to develop a general equilibrium version of the model that produced
these factor prices as equilibrium prices. In terms of of our empirical application, one
can think of the East as being a relatively skilled-labor abundant Southeast Asian coun-
try (such as Singapore) and the South as being a relatively unskilled-labor abundant
Southeast Asian country (such as the Philippines).6
Production entails a ￿xed cost f% in terms of skilled labor (the numeraire) and the size
of this ￿xed cost depends on the location of production. In particular, we assume that
￿rms in the West need to incur a higher ￿xed cost when operating in East or South than
when operating in their home country (i.e., the West), consistent with the assumptions
in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). For simplicity, we set the ￿xed cost of production
in the West equal to 0, and we let fE = fS = f > 0.
Final goods are tradable, but at a variable cost equal to ￿ between the West and each
of the two other countries and equal to ￿ < ￿ between the East and South. We shall
interpret a regional trade agreement between East and South as a drop in ￿ while holding
6As explained in the Introduction, our empirical analysis does not study these country asymmetries.
We, however, found it natural to develop a theoretical framework that can be used for future empirical
investigations.
10￿ constant.7 For reasons that will become apparent below, we shall also assume that
the following inequality holds (though we discuss what happens when this assumption is
relaxed):
Assumption 1: ￿ >
￿
wE
U=wS
U
￿(1￿￿) :
We next compute the pro￿ts associated with the di⁄erent organizational strategies of
a ￿rm in the West with productivity ’. A ￿rst convenient implication of Assumption 1 is
that it ensures that the Western market is necessarily served domestically, that is from a
plant located in the West.8 Hence, the key organizational decision in the model is whether
to also have a plant in East and/or the South. Because the pro￿ts obtained from sales in
the West are independent of this organizational decision, we ignore them hereafter.
Consider ￿rst the case in which the ￿rm in the West only has one plant and this
plant is located in the West. In such a case, the East and the South are serviced through
exports from the West. Given the demand levels in East and South and the unit variable
cost of production c% (’) =
￿
wW
U
￿1￿￿ =’, it is straightforward to compute the join pro￿ts
associated with this strategy:
￿
X (’) =
1
￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)’
￿
￿￿￿1 ￿1￿￿ ￿
AE + AS￿
(wW
U )
(1￿￿)(￿￿1) . (1)
Alternatively, the ￿rm in the West could decide to open one plant in the East. This
option would not a⁄ect the variable unit cost of production (wW
U = wE
U) and would
increase ￿xed costs by an amount f, but it would also reduce shipping costs associated
with servicing the East and the South.9 The pro￿ts in East and South associated with
this option are:
￿
I_E (’) =
1
￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)’
￿
￿￿￿1  
AE + ￿1￿￿AS
(wE
U)
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
!
￿ f. (2)
Similarly, the ￿rm in the West could decide to set up one plant in the South, an option
7Althought a free trade area would drive trade policy costs to zero, natural trade barriers would still
imply ￿ > 1.
8It is clear that as long as wW
U = wE
U, a ￿rm would never want to service the West with exports from
a plant located in the East because this would entail positive transport costs and a higher ￿xed cost.
Provided that wS
U or ￿ ￿ is su¢ ciently high (as Assumption 1 imposes), servicing the West from a plant in
the South is not optimal either.
9Because ￿ > ￿, the ￿rm would choose to service the South via exports from the plant in the East.
Hence, under this strategy, exports from the West are equal to 0.
11that would generate joint pro￿ts in East and South equal to
￿
I_S (’) =
1
￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)’
￿
￿￿￿1  
￿1￿￿AE + AS
(wS
U)
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
!
￿ f: (3)
The ￿nal alternative available to ￿rms in the West is to set up production plants in
both East and South, in which case each of the three markets is serviced through local
sales. Straightforward calculations deliver a joint pro￿t level in East and South equal to
￿
I_ES (’) =
1
￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)’
￿
￿￿￿1  
AE
(wE
U)
(1￿￿)(￿￿1) +
AS
(wS
U)
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
!
￿ 2f: (4)
3.2 Analysis
Having computed the pro￿ts associated with each of these options, we next analyze how
the optimal organizational form of ￿rms varies with levels of productivity ’. In particular,
we will identify the organizational mode k 2 fX;I_E;I_S;I_ESg that maximizes prof-
its ￿k (’). For that purpose, it proves convenient to follow Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004) and Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) in expressing the pro￿t function associated with
each alternative as a linear function of the modi￿ed productivity measure ’￿￿1, that is
￿
k (’) =  
k’
￿￿1 ￿ f
k, (5)
where fk is the ￿xed cost associated with option k and where  
k can be backed out from
equations (1) through (4).
Our ￿rst observation is that because the ￿xed cost associated with the strategies I_E
and I_S is identical, the choice between these two options depends only on the relative
magnitude of  
I_E and  
I_S and is thus independent of productivity. Manipulation of
equations (2) and (3) indicates that investing only in the East dominates investing only
in the South whenever
AE + ￿1￿￿AS
￿1￿￿AE + AS >
￿
wE
U
wS
U
￿(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
. (6)
Other things equal, investment in the East is more likely to be chosen if the market size
of the East is large relative to the South (if AE is large relative to AS) and if the cost
of production in the East is not disproportionately high relative to the South, which is
true when wage di⁄erences are small (i.e., when wE
U=wS
U is low) or when production is
relatively skill-intensive (when ￿ is high). Finally, a high shipping cost between East and
12South (a high ￿) also favors FDI in East provided that AE > AS, while it favors FDI in
South whenever AS > AE. Intuitively, when there is only one plant in the Southeast area,
higher transportation costs between South and East generate an incentive to concentrate
production in the relatively large country. By the same argument, a fall in ￿ reduces the
importance of market size in determining the location of MNE activity and increases the
role of factor cost considerations.
We next compare the option of exporting from the West with the three alternative
FDI strategies. Combining equation (5) with equations (1)-(4) and using Assumption 1,
it is simple to establish that the following inequalities hold:
 
I_ES > max
￿
 
I_E; 
I_S￿
> min
￿
 
I_E; 
I_S￿
>  
X,
and
f
I_ES = 2f > f
I_E = f
I_S = f > f
X = 0.
These rankings immediately imply that a su¢ ciently productive Western ￿rm chooses
some form of FDI over exporting, while a ￿rm with a su¢ ciently low productivity level
necessarily prefers exporting to any form of FDI.10 These results parallel those obtained
by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), but our analysis permits a comparison of single-
plant FDI with multiple-plant FDI and allows for the possibility of a¢ liate exports. The
rankings above immediately imply that only the most productive ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table
to establish a¢ liates in both the East and the South, while ￿rms with intermediate levels
of productivity may decide to undertake FDI in just one of the two countries.11
We use Figure 1 to illustrate these results. As in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)
and Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), we plot the pro￿t functions of all four possible orga-
nizational modes as a function of the modi￿ed productivity measure ’￿￿1. As is clear
from the Figure, ￿rms with low productivity ’ (’ < ’￿
X) ￿nd it optimal to service both
East and South via exporting. Conversely, ￿rms above a certain productivity threshold
(’ > ’￿
I_ES) optimally choose to set up plants in both countries. Finally, ￿rms with in-
termediate productivity levels, this is ’ 2
￿
’￿
X;’￿
I_ES
￿
; have one plant in either East or
South and will not export from the West. The location of this plant depends on whether
10In particular, note that ￿I_E (’) ￿ ￿X (’), ￿I_S (’) ￿ ￿X (’) and ￿I_ES (’) ￿ ￿X (’) all increase
unboundedly with ’. Furthermore, as ’ ! 0, only the exporting option remains pro￿table.
11When Assumption 1 does not hold, the operating pro￿ts associated with setting up only one a¢ liate
in the South are strictly higher than those obtained when setting up only one a¢ liate in the East and
when setting up an a¢ liate in both the East and the South. In such a case, the least productive ￿rms
export, while the most productive ￿rms engage in single-plant FDI in the South. No other organizational
mode is optimal in equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Sorting of Firms into Organizational Modes
condition (6) holds. Figure 1 illustrates the case in which condition (6) holds (perhaps
because the Eastern market size is larger or because the good is relatively skill-intensive)
and the plant is located in the East.
3.3 E⁄ects of a Regional Trade Agreement
We can now consider the e⁄ects of a regional trade agreement between the East and
the South, which we associate with a fall in ￿ in the model, holding other parameters
constant.12 Notice that the pro￿ts associated with the exporting decision and the multiple-
plant FDI decision are independent of ￿, while the pro￿tability of each of the two FDI
strategies involving one plant is positively a⁄ected by the fall in ￿. Although the free
trade area does not increase the sales and pro￿ts in the market where the a¢ liate is
located, it does increase the attractiveness of this plant as an export-platform to the
other country in the FTA. In terms of Figure 1, the slopes of the functions ￿I_E and ￿I_S
necessarily increase, which translates into a fall in the threshold ’￿
X and entry of new
12In reality, an FTA would be likely to a⁄ect other variables in the model, such as wage rates and the
demand level. We attempt to control for these factors in the econometric exercises in Section 4.
14Western a¢ liates in the South-East area. This in turn implies that, consistent with the
￿ndings reported in Table 1:
Prediction 1 An FTA between the East and the South increases the number of Western
￿rms engaging in FDI in the South-East area.
A second implication of the increase in the slopes of the pro￿t functions ￿I_E and ￿I_S
is that the threshold ’￿
I_ES necessarily goes up as a result of the regional trade agreement.
Consequently, some Western ￿rms that initially had two a¢ liates in the South-East area
now optimally choose to shut down one of their plants and concentrate the location of
production in only one country in the area. The model thus predicts gross entry and exit
as a result of the FTA, and the net e⁄ect on the number of Western a¢ liates located in the
South-East area is in general ambiguous. However, when the distribution of productivity
across ￿rms is Pareto distributed (an assumption consistent with available evidence), it is
possible to show that gross entry of a¢ liates exceeds gross exit. Under this assumption,
the model predicts an increase in the number of Western a¢ liates operating in the South-
East area (see the Appendix for details). Consistent with the ￿ndings described in Section
2, we have that:
Prediction 2 An FTA between East and South generates gross entry and gross exit
of Western a¢ liates in the South-East area. Furthermore, when ￿rm productivity
follows a Pareto distribution, the FTA generates a net increase in the number of
Western a¢ liates in the South-East area.
We next consider the e⁄ects of the regional trade agreement on measures of a¢ liate
activity. Although in Section 2, we document changes in four alternative measures of
activity, we focus for the most part on deriving predictions for a¢ liate sales, which is the
measure most easily retrievable from the model. It is simplest to ￿rst discuss predictions
at the a¢ liate level. In our model, because ￿rm-level sales are proportional to ￿rm-level
operating pro￿ts, it follows from our discussion above that a¢ liates that exist before the
regional trade agreement (weakly) increase their level of sales as a result of the fall in
South-East trade barriers. This increase is quali￿ed with the word weakly because ￿rms
with two a¢ liates before and after the FTA are not predicted to change their activity as
a result of the FTA. Noting that factor prices are independent of ￿ and that the variable
cost function is homothetic, we can also conclude that other measures of a¢ liate activity,
such as assets, employment compensation, and net property plant and equipment (net
PPE) also (weakly) increase as a result of the FTA. Hence, we can state that:
15Prediction 3 Conditional on survival, an FTA between the East and the South weakly
increases economic activity (in terms of sales, assets, employment compensation,
and net PPE) at the a¢ liate level.
This prediction is consistent with the intensive margin results in Table 2, but the
prediction is more nuanced in that we predict growth at the a¢ liate level, rather than
just an increase in a¢ liate sales among surviving a¢ liates. We test this prediction in the
next section.
Does Prediction 3 necessarily imply that aggregate a¢ liate sales in the South-East
area increases as a result of the FTA, as we documented in Section 2? Not necessarily. As
shown above, the FTA leads to gross exit of some plants in the area, as some two-plant
MNEs become one-plant MNEs. A¢ liate sales for this group of MNEs necessarily falls as a
result of the FTA, and this decrease may not be o⁄set by the increase in sales of surviving
a¢ liates. The overall e⁄ect on aggregate a¢ liate sales depends of the distribution of
productivity in the population, just as our prediction on the number of a¢ liates does.
We show in the Appendix that when productivity follows a Pareto distribution, aggregate
a¢ liate sales are indeed decreasing in ￿. In sum, we have that:
Prediction 4 When ￿rm productivity follows a Pareto distribution, the FTA leads to
an increase in aggregate a¢ liate sales in the South-East area.
We can derive further predictions by studying the direction of sales implied by the
model. Notice that Western ￿rms with a¢ liates in both the East and the South will have
a¢ liates that sell all of their output in their local market. Hence, the level of a¢ liate
third-country sales is zero both for exporters as well as for two-plant MNEs. On the other
hand, under condition 6, ￿rms with productivity ’ 2
￿
’￿
X;’￿
I_ES
￿
sell an amount
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)’
￿
￿￿￿1 AE
(wE
U)
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
in the Eastern (local market) and an amount
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)’
￿
￿￿￿1 ￿1￿￿AS
(wE
U)
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)
in the Southern market. The ratio of a¢ liate third-market sales to local sales is thus given
by ￿1￿￿AS=AE. It is independent of productivity and decreasing in ￿. When condition (6)
does not hold, single-a¢ liate ￿rms operate in the South, but the share of third-country
16sales by a¢ liates is either 0 or a positive number that decreases in ￿. Putting all the
pieces together, we can conclude that:
Prediction 5 An FTA between the East and the South increases the share of a¢ liate
sales going to third countries for three reasons. First, new entrants into the South-
East area sell more to third markets than the average Western-owned plant in the
area. Second, ￿rms that consolidate two a¢ liates into one have a¢ liates with pos-
itive sales to third markets, and they did not before. Third, ￿rms with only one
a¢ liate before and after the FTA also increase the share of a¢ liate sales going to
third markets.
In Table 4 we presented broad patterns consistent with these predictions, but we test
these predictions more formally in the next section.
4 Econometric Evidence
The ￿rst prediction from the theory is that the formation of the free trade area increases
the number of U.S. MNEs operating there. The number counts in Table 1 suggest this
is the case. There is also evidence for Prediction 2 in that the number of a¢ liates in the
ASEAN region increases, and the rate of increase exceeds the rate of increase in other
Asian countries. In order to consider the evidence for the other predictions, we turn to
detailed ￿rm level data. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for these data.
Prediction 3 of the theory holds that a¢ liates that exist before the formation of the
FTA and survive should increase their activity. The speci￿cations presented in Table 6
test for this e⁄ect. The tests explain growth in measures of U.S. MNE activity over the
1989-1994 period using measures of changes at the a¢ liate level. Therefore, the data
only measure growth on the intensive margin because changes can only be measured for
a¢ liates that are observed in both 1989 and 1994. The sample includes observations
from all ASEAN countries as well as other Asian countries. The main coe¢ cient of
interest is the one on the ASEAN dummy; it reveals if a¢ liate growth within the ASEAN
region is larger than growth elsewhere in Asia. The speci￿cations also control for per
capita GDP growth and changes in the corporate tax rate. Heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors that allow for clustering at the country level are computed and appear in
parentheses.
The dependent variable in the ￿rst two columns is sales growth, and it is measured
by taking the di⁄erence between end and beginning of period values of sales and dividing
17by average values. The 0.1638 coe¢ cient on the ASEAN dummy in column 1 is positive
and signi￿cant, as is the coe¢ cient on this variable in column 2. The speci￿cations in
columns 3-8 explain asset growth, employment compensation growth, and growth in net
PPE, and the coe¢ cient on the ASEAN dummy is positive and signi￿cant in each of
the speci￿cations except those presented in column 6 and 7.13 These results imply that
a¢ liates that were active in the ASEAN region before and after the formation of AFTA
increase their activity by larger amounts than surviving a¢ liates that operate in other
Asian countries over a similar period. These ￿ndings are consistent with the claim that
FTAs have a positive e⁄ect on the level of activity of a¢ liates that existed before the
FTA and remain active after its formation.
The theory does not carry decisive predictions concerning how the formation of an FTA
a⁄ects overall levels of multinational production and sales. Although new ￿rms enter the
FTA region and surviving a¢ liates expand, ￿xed costs of investment can induce some ￿rms
to close an a¢ liate and serve that a¢ liate￿ s host country through trade, thereby reducing
aggregate sales. Prediction 4 indicates, however, that the latter e⁄ect is dominated in the
plausible case of a Pareto distribution of productivity. In order to empirically analyze the
net impact of these e⁄ects, we perform the tests presented in Table 7. These tests are
similar to those presented in Table 6, but the data are aggregated to the country/industry
level. Therefore, the estimates of the coe¢ cient on the ASEAN dummy captures growth
that is due to the net entry of a¢ liates in addition to the growth of surviving a¢ liates.
These coe¢ cients are slightly larger in the speci￿cations in Table 7 relative to Table 6,
and they are all signi￿cant except the one in column 2. The slightly larger estimates on
the ASEAN dummy indicate that part of the disproportionately high levels of growth of
U.S. MNE activity in ASEAN countries is a consequence of net entry, or the extensive
margin. Consolidation of activity by ￿rms following the formation of AFTA is more than
o⁄set by the entry of new ￿rms. This result would be predicted under many distributions
of productivity, like a Pareto distribution, as indicated in Prediction 4.
Prediction 5 suggests that a part of growth in a¢ liate sales observed in Table 6 is
due to growth in sales to third countries. Speci￿cally, the theory indicates that surviving
a¢ liates of those ￿rms that are active in only one country after the formation of AFTA
should increase their sales to third countries. Such ￿rms include ￿rms that were active
in more than one country prior to AFTA and consolidated activity as well as ￿rms that
13Statements about levels of signi￿cance are based on the large sample properties of t-statistics. If one
assumes that the degrees of freedom is equal to the number of clusters, which is 22 for the number of
countries in the data, results presented in column 8 of Table 6 and column 6 of Table 9 are only signi￿cant
at the 6% level.
18operated in one country both before and after the formation of AFTA.
The speci￿cations presented in Table 8 test for this possibility. The dependent vari-
ables are components of sales growth; they are measures of sales growth due to sales to
the host country, to the U.S., and to third countries. Each component of sales growth is
measured by scaling the ￿rst di⁄erence in sales to a particular location by the average of
beginning and end of period aggregate a¢ liate sales. Therefore, the three components of
sales growth sum to the measure of a¢ liate sales growth analyzed in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 6. The speci￿cations in the odd numbered columns are similar to those in previous
tables, but those in the even numbered columns di⁄er in that they include the ASEAN
dummy interacted with a dummy that is equal to one for ￿rms that operate in only a
single ASEAN country after the formation of AFTA. In these speci￿cations, the coe¢ cient
on the ASEAN dummy captures the e⁄ects of being in an ASEAN country around the
time of the formation of AFTA, and the coe¢ cient on the interaction term identi￿es if
the e⁄ects of being in an ASEAN country di⁄er for ￿rms that operate in a single ASEAN
country in 1994. We introduce this interaction because our model predicts a growth in
third-market sales only for the subset of a¢ liates owned by U.S. multinational ￿rms with
a single a¢ liate in ASEAN countries after the formation of AFTA.
The -0.0018 coe¢ cient on the ASEAN dummy in column 1 indicates that AFTA did
not increase sales to the host country. In the second column, this coe¢ cient remains
insigni￿cant, and the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is also insigni￿cant, indicating
that AFTA did not di⁄erentially a⁄ect the local sales of ￿rms operating in one ASEAN
country after the formation of AFTA. The next two columns analyze the growth in sales
due to U.S. sales. The positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the ASEAN dummy in column
3 and the positive and marginally signi￿cant coe¢ cient on it in column 4 suggest that
sales to the U.S. increased around the time AFTA was created. There does not appear to
be any di⁄erential e⁄ect for ￿rms that compete in only a single ASEAN country after the
formation of AFTA. While interesting, this result is beyond the scope of the theory. The
￿nal two columns analyze the growth in sales due to third country sales, which the model
emphasizes. The 0.0391 coe¢ cient in column 5 is positive but not signi￿cant, suggesting
that the share of sales to third countries does not increase on average for all a¢ liates. The
positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the interaction term in the speci￿cation in column
6 is consistent with Prediction 4. AFTA appears to increase the third country sales of
a¢ liates of ￿rms that operate in a single ASEAN country after the FTA, either because
they have consolidated or maintained their activities.
Prediction 5 also asserts that the share of sales to third countries should increase in
19response to the formation of an FTA in part because new a¢ liates sell more to third
countries than preexisting a¢ liates. The tests presented in Table 9 consider this possibil-
ity. The speci￿cations explain the share of sales to the host country, to the U.S., and to
third countries for the sample of a¢ liates in Asia in 1994. The speci￿cations include an
ASEAN dummy, a dummy for new a¢ liates, the interaction of these two, and controls
for the log of per capita GDP and the corporate tax rate. In these speci￿cations, the
coe¢ cients on the ASEAN dummy estimate the di⁄erence in sales shares for ASEAN
as opposed to other Asian a¢ liates, the coe¢ cient on the new a¢ liate dummy picks up
di⁄erences in sales shares for new a¢ liates, and the coe¢ cient on the interaction term
identi￿es if new a¢ liates have distinctive sales patterns relative to preexisting a¢ liates in
ASEAN countries. Prediction 5 suggests the coe¢ cient on this interaction term should
be positive in speci￿cations explaining the share of sales to third countries.
The new a¢ liate dummy is de￿ned in two ways. In the odd numbered columns, this
variable is equal to one for all a¢ liates that appear in the data in 1994 but not in 1989.
In the theory, ￿rms that establish new a¢ liates in response to the formation of an FTA
establish a single a¢ liate. However, the theory does not consider a variety of factors
that might induce a ￿rm to enter many ASEAN markets after the creation of AFTA. For
example, ￿rms could face trade costs within the ASEAN region that re￿ ect nontari⁄costs
of moving their goods. Such ￿rms may be induced to enter two or more ASEAN countries
following the introduction of AFTA, directing a large fraction of their sales to the host
country. In the even numbered columns, the new a¢ liate dummy is de￿ned to equal one
for new a¢ liates in ASEAN countries provided that the a¢ liate￿ s ￿rm operates in only a
single ASEAN country in 1994. It is also equal to one for all new a¢ liates in other Asian
countries. The interaction term therefore isolates e⁄ects for the type of new a¢ liate that
is considered in the theory.
The coe¢ cients on the ASEAN dummies indicate that surviving a¢ liates in ASEAN
countries have a lower share of host country sales and a higher share of U.S. and third
country sales than surviving a¢ liates in other Asian countries. The coe¢ cients on the
dummy for new a¢ liates are all insigni￿cant, implying that new a¢ liates in other Asian
countries do not exhibit a pattern of sales that is distinctive from surviving a¢ liates in
those countries. The coe¢ cients on the interaction terms are also insigni￿cant, except
for the one in the last column. The positive and signi￿cant 0.0738 coe¢ cient implies
that new a¢ liates in ASEAN countries that are a part of ￿rms that operate in only a
single ASEAN country have higher shares of sales to third countries than other a¢ liates
in ASEAN countries. This di⁄erence in the direction of sales for new a¢ liates is not
20observed in the rest of Asia. These results are consistent with Prediction 5.
These empirical results are subject to a number of reasonable concerns, and we have
conducted several robustness tests to address these. A couple of issues might distort
the ￿ndings on a¢ liate growth presented in Tables 6 and 7. First, the disproportionate
growth of a¢ liate activity in ASEAN countries could re￿ ect low levels of a¢ liate growth
in other Asian countries rather than high levels of a¢ liate growth in ASEAN countries.
Several factors could induce such a pattern. For example, the formation of AFTA may
attract U.S. foreign investment away from other regional countries. In order to consider
this possibility, we conduct the tests presented in Table 6 and 7 using a sample that
is comprised of a¢ liates in ASEAN countries and a¢ liates in European countries. The
results obtained using this sample are qualitatively similar to the results presented in the
paper with the exception that the coe¢ cient on the ASEAN Dummy in the speci￿cation
presented in column 8 of Table 6 is no longer signi￿cant.14 The results in each table
are also largely robust to removing Australia and Japan from the sample of other Asian
countries; these nations are large and developed, and multinational activity in them may
be distinctive.
Second, many of the provisions of the ASEAN FTA did not take e⁄ect until after 1994,
so it is potentially informative to study growth in activity over the 1989 to 1999 period
as opposed to the 1989 to 1994 period. We have conducted the tests presented in Table
6 and 7 of the paper using this longer sample period. The coe¢ cients on the ASEAN
dummy in these speci￿cations generally maintain their signi￿cance, but these coe¢ cients
are insigni￿cant in the speci￿cations presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6, and the
coe¢ cient on the ASEAN dummy in the speci￿cation presented in column 6 of Table 7 is
only marginally signi￿cant.
The speci￿cations presented include a parsimonious set of controls. Other country
characteristics could be changing at the same time that AFTA is formed, and these
might confound our results on patterns in a¢ liate growth. For example, the extent to
which countries place restrictions on foreign direct investment or changes in political
regimes could be coincident with the formation of AFTA and explain patterns in U.S.
multinational growth. To address this issue, we have conducted the analysis in Tables
6 and 7 including controls for changes in FDI restrictions drawn from Shatz (2000) and
for political regime changes drawn from Marshall and Jaggers (2009).15 Some results are
14Although it is less clear why these considerations would bias the results in Tables 8 and 9, we have
also checked the robustness of our results in those tables, and the results are similar.
15Changes in FDI restrictions are measured as changes in a dummy that is set equal to one if the
acquisition or sector scores in Shatz (2000) are less than 3. Regime changes are measured as changes in
21only marginally signi￿cant when these controls are included, but for the most part the
results are little changed by them. We do not include these controls in the speci￿cations
we present because these data cover only a subset of the countries in the BEA data.
Although the BEA data include ￿rms in all industries, the theory envisions a ￿rm that
uses labor to produce a tradeable good. Therefore, the predictions might be more relevant
to manufacturing ￿rms than they are to ￿rms in other industries. We have performed
the analysis in Tables 6-8 limiting the sample to a¢ liates in manufacturing industries.
The results of the tests in Table 6 and 7 are stronger than those obtained using the full
sample, but the tests presented in columns 6 of Table 8 and 9 are no longer signi￿cant,
perhaps because the sample size is smaller.
Finally, we have rerun all of the speci￿cations dropping each ASEAN country, one at
a time, to see if activity related to a particular country drives the results. Although this
yields some variation in the estimates, no single ASEAN country is central to the results.
5 Conclusion
Even though existing studies of regional trade agreements focus on their impact on trade
￿ ows, these agreements appear to have large e⁄ects on the level and nature of multina-
tional ￿rm activity. In this paper we build on recent theoretical work to develop a model
of the behavior of heterogenous ￿rms based in one country when there is a reduction in
the tari⁄s on trade between two other countries. This model generates a series of predic-
tions that we consider in the context of how U.S. multinational ￿rms responded to the
formation of the ASEAN free trade agreement. Examination of aggregate data and more
detailed ￿rm-level analysis indicates that measures of U.S. multinational activity increase
at the time AFTA is created. Speci￿cally, the number of U.S. ￿rms that are active in
the region increases at a faster rate than the number of U.S. ￿rms active in other Asian
countries. A¢ liates within the ASEAN regions grow by larger amounts than a¢ liates
elsewhere. There are also distinct shifts in the direction of sales of ASEAN a¢ liates.
These a¢ liates increase the share of sales to countries other than the U.S. and the a¢ l-
iate￿ s host country. This increase re￿ ects two channels for ￿rms that focus their activity
in a single ASEAN country after the formation of AFTA. First, there are high levels of
growth in third-country sales for a¢ liates that are active before and after the formation
of AFTA. In addition, new a¢ liates in ASEAN countries direct a larger share of their
sales to third countries than new a¢ liates elsewhere in Asia. These ￿ndings are consistent
the Polity2 variable in Marshall and Jaggers (2009).
22with the model￿ s predictions.
Our results have signi￿cant implications for the welfare e⁄ects of regional trade agree-
ments. Increased multinational ￿rm activity in a regional free trade area is likely to
generate bene￿ts within the region as multinationals typically exhibit high levels of pro-
ductivity, pay high wages, and create positive spillovers for other ￿rms. Policy makers
from excluded countries have reason to support the creation of regional trade agreements
because ￿rms from excluded countries can bene￿t through the use of foreign direct in-
vestment.
The ￿ndings also point out the relevance of incorporating ￿rm level heterogeneity into
models of multinational ￿rms. Only recently have these theories been confronted with
￿rm-level data that allow for a careful analysis of intensive and extensive responses to
shifts in environmental factors.
23A Appendix
In this Appendix we brie￿ y discuss the e⁄ects of the regional trade agreement in the model for
the case in which the distribution of productivity G(’) is Pareto, so that
G(’) = 1 ￿
￿
b
’
￿k
,
with k > ￿ ￿ 1, a condition needed for the distribution of sale revenue to have ￿nite variance.
Given our results in the model, Western parents with productivity lower than ’￿
X have no
a¢ liates in the South-East area, those with productivity between ’￿
X and ’￿
I_ES have one
a¢ liate, and those with productivity higher than ’￿
I_ES have two. Normalizing the total measure
of U.S. ￿rms to 1, we have that the measure of a¢ liates in the South-East area is given by
n = G
￿
’￿
I_ES
￿
￿ G(’￿
X) + 2
￿
1 ￿ G
￿
’￿
I_ES
￿￿
= 2 ￿
￿
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X) + G
￿
’￿
I_ES
￿￿
=
 
b
’￿
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+
￿
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’￿
X
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.
It then follows that
@n
@￿
= ￿kbk
"￿
’￿
I_ES
￿￿k￿1 @’￿
I_ES
@￿
+ (’￿
X)
￿k￿1 @’￿
X
@￿
#
,
which at ￿rst sight appears ambiguous since @’￿
X=@￿ > 0 but @’￿
I_ES=@￿ < 0. Using the
de￿nitions of ’￿
X and ’￿
I_ES, that is,
’￿
X =
￿
f
 I_E ￿  X
￿1=(￿￿1)
(A1)
and
’￿
I_ES =
￿
f
 I_ES ￿  I_E
￿1=(￿￿1)
, (A2)
we ￿nd however that
@’￿
X
@￿
@’￿
I_ES
@￿
= ￿
 
’￿
X
’￿
I_ES
!￿
,
and thus
@n
@￿
= kbk
@’￿
I_ES
@￿ ￿
’￿
I_ES
￿￿
￿
(’￿
X)
￿(k￿(￿￿1)) ￿
￿
’￿
I_ES
￿￿(k￿(￿￿1))￿
< 0,
which is negative because @’￿
I_ES=@￿ < 0, k > ￿ ￿ 1, and ’￿
I_ES > ’￿
X.
We next study the e⁄ect of the agreement on aggregate a¢ liate sales. Aggregate sales of
24Western multinationals with one a¢ liate are given by
RI_E =
Z ’￿
I_ES
’￿
X
￿ I_E’￿￿1dG(’)
= ￿ I_E
Z ’￿
I_ES
’￿
X
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= ￿ I_E kbk
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￿￿(k￿(￿￿1))￿
On the other hand, aggregate sales of a¢ liates of Western multinational ￿rms with two a¢ liates
are given by:
RI_ES =
Z 1
’￿
I_ES
￿ I_ES’￿￿1dG(’)
= ￿ I_ES
Z 1
’￿
X
’￿￿1kbk’￿k￿1d’
= ￿ I_ES kbk
k ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
’￿
I_ES
￿￿(k￿(￿￿1))
Aggregate a¢ liate sales are then given by
R = ￿
￿
 I_E ￿ (’￿
X)
￿(k￿(￿￿1)) +
￿
 I_ES ￿  I_E￿
￿
￿
’￿
I_ES
￿￿(k￿(￿￿1))￿
,
where ￿ is a constant. Using (A1) and (A2), we can write this expression as
R = ￿
￿
 I_X ￿ (’￿
X)
￿(k￿(￿￿1)) + f ￿ (’￿
X)
￿k + f ￿
￿
’￿
I_ES
￿￿k￿
.
But note that  I_X is independent of ￿, (’￿
X)
￿(k￿(￿￿1)) is decreasing in ￿ (for k > ￿ ￿ 1),
while in our derivations regarding the number of a¢ liates above, we have shown that (’￿
X)
￿k +
￿
’￿
I_ES
￿￿k
is also decreasing in ￿. Hence, we can conclude that when productivity follows a
Pareto distribution, a regional trade agreement between the South and the East (i.e., a fall in
￿) increases a¢ liate sales in the area.
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271989 1994 Growth Rate
ASEAN Countries
Number of Affiliates 740                  1,065               44%
Number of Parents 309                  403                  30%
Aggregate Sales 36,939,740      83,218,640      125%
Aggregate Assets 28,103,986      68,206,904      143%
Aggregate Employment Compensation 2,216,711        5,346,706        141%
Aggregate Net PPE 11,903,194      27,964,768      135%
Other Asian Countries
Number of Affiliates 2,417               3,052               26%
Number of Parents 775                  934                  21%
Aggregate Sales 233,633,360    308,670,176    32%
Aggregate Assets 171,856,768    258,032,128    50%
Aggregate Employment Compensation 25,960,936      37,153,888      43%
Aggregate Net PPE 59,890,208      92,479,056      54%
Effects on Aggregate Activity
Table 1
This table presents measures of U.S. multinational aggregate activity in ASEAN and other Asian countries in 1989 and 
1994.  The sample includes nonbank affiliates that filed long or short survey forms.  Number of Affiliates and Number of 
Parents are, respectively, the number of U.S. MNE affiliates and parents operating in the region.  Net PPE measures the 
net property, plant, and equipment of MNE affiliates.  Growth rates are computed by taking the difference between 1994 
and 1989 values and dividing by 1989 values.1989 1994 Growth Rate
ASEAN Countries
Number of Affiliates 507 507                  0%
Aggregate Sales 31,365,546      67,467,664      115%
Aggregate Assets 22,387,278      49,965,720      123%
Aggregate Employment Compensation 1,806,404        3,898,378        116%
Aggregate Net PPE 9,720,393        19,589,564      102%
Other Asian Countries
Number of Affiliates 1,591               1,591               0%
Aggregate Sales 181,131,168    256,260,880    41%
Aggregate Assets 131,140,912    201,230,736    53%
Aggregate Employment Compensation 20,550,656      30,694,388      49%
Aggregate Net PPE 46,193,692      69,387,904      50%
Table 2
Effects on Aggregate Activity: Intensive Margin
This table presents measures of U.S. multinational aggregate activity in ASEAN and other Asian countries in 1989 and 
1994 for affiliates that report activity in both years.   The sample includes nonbank affiliates that filed long or short 
survey forms.  Number of Affiliates is the number of U.S. MNE affiliates operating in the region.  Net PPE measures the 
net property, plant, and equipment of MNE affiliates.  Growth rates are computed by taking the difference between 1994 
and 1989 values and dividing by 1989 values.Exiting Affiliate 
1989 Activity
Entering Affiliate 
1994 Activity
ASEAN Countries
Number of Affiliates 233                        558                       
Aggregate Sales 5,574,194              15,750,973           
Aggregate Assets 5,716,708              18,241,180           
Aggregate Employment Compensation 410,307                 1,448,328             
Aggregate Net PPE 2,182,801              8,375,202             
Other Asian Countries
Number of Affiliates 826                        1,461                    
Aggregate Sales 52,502,180            52,409,312           
Aggregate Assets 40,715,852            56,801,392           
Aggregate Employment Compensation 5,410,280              6,459,498             
Aggregate Net PPE 13,696,517            23,091,148           
Table 3
Effects on Aggregate Activity: Extensive Margin
This table presents measures of U.S. multinational aggregate activity in ASEAN and other Asian countries in 
1989 and 1994 for affiliates that report activity only in either 1989 or 1994.   The sample includes nonbank 
affiliates that filed long or short survey forms.  The first column provides 1989 aggregates for affiliates that 
exit the sample after 1989 and before 1994, and the second column provides 1994 aggregates for affiliates that 
enter the sample after 1989 and before 1994.  Number of Affiliates is the number of U.S. MNE affiliates 
operating in the region.  Net PPE measures the net property, plant, and equipment of MNE affiliates.Panel A: All Affiliate Activity 1989 1994
ASEAN Countries
Share of Sales to the Host Country Market 45.8% 47.1%
Share of Sales to the U.S. 25.9% 20.4%
Share of Sales to Third Countries 28.3% 32.5%
Other Asian Countries
Share of Sales to the Host Country Market 78.6% 83.1%
Share of Sales to the U.S. 8.6% 5.7%
Share of Sales to Third Countries 12.8% 11.2%
Panel B: Surviving Affiliates 1989 1994
ASEAN Countries
Share of Sales to the Host Country Market 43.8% 45.9%
Share of Sales to the U.S. 28.4% 21.9%
Share of Sales to Third Countries 27.8% 32.2%
Other Asian Countries
Share of Sales to the Host Country Market 79.9% 81.5%
Share of Sales to the U.S. 9.0% 6.1%
Share of Sales to Third Countries 11.1% 12.4%
Panel C: Entrants and Exits
Exiting Affiliates 1989 
Activity
Entering Affiliate 1994 
Activity
ASEAN Countries
Share of Sales to the Host Country Market 46.5% 41.2%
Share of Sales to the U.S. 20.1% 17.6%
Share of Sales to Third Countries 33.3% 41.2%
Other Asian Countries
Share of Sales to the Host Country Market 74.4% 85.0%
Share of Sales to the U.S. 9.6% 4.8%
Share of Sales to Third Countries 16.0% 10.1%
Table 4
Effects on Aggregate Sales Patterns
This table presents information on the direction of sales of affiliates in ASEAN and other Asian countries.   The sample includes majority-owned 
nonbank affiliates that filed long or short survey forms.  The top panel presents data on the activities of all affiliates, the second panel presents data 
only on those affiliates that appear in both the 1989 and 1994 samples, and the bottom panel presents data on affiliates that exit and enter the 
sample between 1989 and 1994.  In order to avoid the potential disclosure of confidential information, the top panel was constructed using 
published data that do not include figures for Brunei, but the other panels cover all ASEAN countries.  In the bottom panel, the first column 
provides 1989 figures for affiliates that appear in the 1989 sample but not in the 1994 sample, and the second column provides 1994 figures for 
affiliates that appear in the 1994 sample but not the 1989 sample.  Share of Sales to the Host Country Market measures the ratio of sales to persons 
in the affiliates host country to affiliate total sales.  Share of Sales to the U.S. and Share of Sales to Third Countries respectively measure the share 
of sales to person in the U.S. and to countries other than the U.S. and the affiliate's host country.Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Affiliate Measures of Growth
Sales Growth 0.4052 0.6670
Asset Growth 0.4178 0.6003
Employment Compensation Growth 0.4778 0.7102
Net PPE Growth 0.3222 0.8691
Growth in Sales due to Local Sales 0.2920 0.5906
Growth in Sales due to U.S. Sales 0.0185 0.2839
Growth in Sales due to Third Country Sales 0.0824 0.3700
Country/Industry Measures of Growth
Sales Growth 0.4780 0.8052
Asset Growth 0.5092 0.8017
Employment Compensation Growth 0.5203 0.8329
Net PPE Growth 0.4941 0.9513
Direction of Sales
Share of Sales to Local Market 0.7894 0.3519
Share of Sales to U.S. 0.0709 0.2201
Share of Sales to Third Countries 0.1397 0.2790
Controls
Per Capita GDP Growth 0.1583 0.1430
Changes in Tax Rate -0.0298 0.0390
Log of per capita GDP 9.3365 1.3979
Tax Rate 0.3146 0.1249
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis.  The top panel diplays 
measures of affiliate activity that are used in the analysis presetned in Tables 6 and 8.  Growth rates of sales, 
assets, employment compensation and net property plant and equipment are measured by taking the difference 
between end and beginning of period values and dividing by the average of end and beginning of period values.  
Growth in sales due to sales to a particular location are computed by taking the difference between end and 
beginning of period values of sales to that location and dividing by the average of end and beginning of period 
values of total sales.  The second panel displays country/industry measures of growth used in the analysis 
presnted in Table 7.  The third panel displays affiliate measures of the direction of affiliate sales in 1994 used in 
the analysis presented in Table 9.  Data on the direction of sales are only reported by majority-owned affiliates.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 
ASEAN Dummy 0.1638 0.0842 0.2014 0.1829 0.2118 0.1380 0.1520 0.1738
(0.0630) (0.0383) (0.0601) (0.0546) (0.0961) (0.0737) (0.1009) (0.0853)
0.6323 0.1634 0.6064 -0.1468
(0.1941) (0.2064) (0.3133) (0.1760)
0.9047 0.6883 1.0420 0.5478
(0.8479) (0.7199) (1.0668) (1.2317)
0.3654 0.3116 0.3690 0.3681 0.4274 0.3806 0.2853 0.3195
(0.0486) (0.0627) (0.0503) (0.0617) (0.0800) (0.0962) (0.0814) (0.1001)
No. of Obs. 2,090 2,090 2,090 2,090 2,023 2,023 2,068 2,068
R-Squared 0.011 0.034 0.021 0.025 0.016 0.035 0.006 0.006
Per Capita GDP 
Growth
Changes in Tax Rate
Constant
Table 6
Affiliate Level Responses
Sales Growth Asset Growth
Employment Compensation 
Growth
Net PPE Growth
This table presents the results of specifications explaining measures of U.S. MNE affiliate growth computed using data at the affiliate level.  The dependent variable is sales growth in the first two 
columns, asset growth in the second two columns, employment compensation in the third two columns, and growth in net property plant and equipment in the last two columns.  The ASEAN 
Dummy is equal to one for ASEAN members, and zero for other Asian countries.  Per Capita GDP Growth measures the growth of GDP per capita in constant dollar terms.  Changes in Tax Rate 
measures the change in the tax rate paid on corporate income by US MNEs.  All growth rates are measured by taking the difference between end and beginning of period values and dividing by the 
average of end and beginning of period values.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that allow for clustering by country appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 
ASEAN Dummy 0.2214 0.1213 0.2530 0.2178 0.3085 0.2082 0.3027 0.3095
(0.1125) (0.0914) (0.0759) (0.0857) (0.1100) (0.0850) (0.0941) (0.1079)
1.1134 0.4645 1.2034 0.0999
(0.4337) (0.4094) (0.3575) (0.4875)
-0.0679 0.3763 0.5470 0.9626
(1.2377) (1.1181) (0.9244) (1.5739)
0.4071 0.2285 0.4282 0.3610 0.4215 0.2395 0.3975 0.3991
(0.0690) (0.0609) (0.0602) (0.0553) (0.0745) (0.0591) (0.0830) (0.0887)
No. of Obs. 665 665 665 665 662 662 664 664
R-Squared 0.017 0.044 0.022 0.028 0.030 0.065 0.022 0.025
Changes in Tax Rate
Constant
Per Capita GDP 
Growth
Table 7
Country/Industry Level Responses
Sales Growth Asset Growth
Employment Compensation 
Growth
Net PPE Growth
This table presents the results of specifications explaining measures of U.S. MNE affiliate growth computed using data at the country/industry level.  The dependent variable is sales growth in the 
first two columns, asset growth in the second two columns, employment compensation in the third two columns, and growth in net property plant and equipment in the last two columns.  The 
ASEAN Dummy is equal to one for ASEAN members, and zero for other Asian countries.  Per Capita GDP Growth measures the growth of GDP per capita in constant dollar terms.  Changes in Tax 
Rate measures the change in the tax rate paid on corporate income by US MNEs.  All growth rates are measured by taking the difference between end and beginning of period values and dividing by 
the average of end and beginning of period values.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that allow for clustering by country appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ASEAN Dummy -0.0018 0.0274 0.0224 0.0230 0.0391 0.0284
(0.0564) (0.0524) (0.0106) (0.0132) (0.0382) (0.0368)
-0.1622 -0.0035 0.0593
(0.1110) (0.0317) (0.0237)
0.5002 0.5134 0.0684 0.0687 0.1989 0.1941
(0.1667) (0.1591) (0.0333) (0.0324) (0.1677) (0.1650)
0.6840 0.6439 -0.0719 -0.0728 0.3278 0.3425
(0.6291) (0.6208) (0.1434) (0.1424) (0.3479) (0.3420)
0.2327 0.2299 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0497 0.0508
(0.0449) (0.0441) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0381) (0.0377)
No. of Obs. 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620
R-Squared 0.020 0.024 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.015
Changes in Tax Rate
Constant
ASEAN Dummy*Dummy if in One 
ASEAN Country in 1994
Per Capita GDP Growth
Table 8
Decomposition of Sales Growth
Growth in Sales Due to Local 
Sales
Growth in Sales Due to U.S. 
Sales
Growth in Sales Due to Third 
Country Sales
This table presents the results of specifications explaining components of the growth of U.S. MNE affiliates measured using data at the affiliate level.  The dependent variable is growth in 
sales due to local sales in the first two columns, the growth in sales due to sales to the U.S. in the second two columns, and the growth in sales due to sales to countries other than the U.S. 
and the affiliate's host country in the last two columns.  The ASEAN Dummy is equal to one for ASEAN members, and zero for other Asian countries.  The Dummy if in One ASEAN 
Country in 1994 is a dummy equal to one for firms that were active in only one ASEAN country in 1994.  Per Capita GDP Growth measures the growth of GDP per capita in constant dollar 
terms.  Changes in Tax Rate measures the change in the tax rate paid on corporate income by U.S. MNEs.  All growth rates are measured by taking the difference between end and beginning 
of period values and dividing by the average of end and beginning of period values.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that allow for clustering by country appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ASEAN Dummy -0.1787 -0.1368 0.0582 0.0410 0.1205 0.0958
(0.0524) (0.0555) (0.0180) (0.0193) (0.0419) (0.0413)
New Affiliate Dummy 0.0314 0.0319 -0.0091 -0.0093 -0.0223 -0.0226
(0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0143) (0.0143)
ASEAN Dummy* 0.0216 -0.1220 -0.0121 0.0482 -0.0095 0.0738
New Affiliate Dummy (0.0309) (0.0812) (0.0119) (0.0497) (0.0210) (0.0371)
-0.0388 -0.0371 0.0105 0.0098 0.0283 0.0273
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0104) (0.0103)
0.7745 0.7662 -0.2061 -0.2026 -0.5684 -0.5636
(0.1873) (0.1899) (0.0843) (0.0859) (0.1137) (0.1148)
0.9495 0.9356 0.0251 0.0310 0.0254 0.0333
(0.0956) (0.0951) (0.0422) (0.0438) (0.0824) (0.0815)
In Asean countries,  new affiliates include 
all new affiliates? YNYNYN
In Asean countries,  new affiliates include 
all new affiliates of firms operating in one 
Asean country in 1994? NYNYNY
No. of Obs. 3,299 3,299 3,299 3,299 3,299 3,299
R-Squared 0.103 0.103 0.022 0.022 0.083 0.084
Constant
Log of Per Capita GDP
Tax Rate
Table 9
Direction of Sales of New Affiliates
Share of Sales to Local Market Share of Sales to U.S. Share of Sales to Third Countries
This table presents the results of specifications explaining the direction of sales of new affiliates.  The sample inlcudes affiliates in ASEAN and other Asian countries that appear in the data in 
1994.  The dependent variable is the share of sales to persons in the affiliate's host country in the first two columns, the share of sales to persons in the U.S. in the second two columns and the 
share of sales to persons in countries other than the U.S. and the affiliate's host country in the last two collumns.  The ASEAN Dummy is equal to one for ASEAN members, and zero for other 
Asian countries.  The New Affiliate Dummy is equal to one for all new affiliates in columns 1, 3, and 5.  In columns 2, 4, and 6, for affiliates in ASEAN countries, it is equal to one for new 
affiliates of firms that operate in only one ASEAN country in 1994, and for affiliates in other Asian countries, it is equal to one for all new affiliates.  Log of Per Capita GDP is the log of per 
capita GDP, and Tax Rate measures the corporate income tax rate.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that allow for clustering by country appear in parentheses.